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This essay is divided into the following sections:
I. On institutional change in broad terms
II. On new forms of management in a nutshell
III. Workers and managers in the enterprise council: “part­
ners” or “adversaries”?
IV. Loopholes in legal regulations
V. Inconsistencies of economic regulations: the possibility 
of a change in reverse
I. On institutional change in broad terms
In an era of organizational reforms we are often confronted with 
the following problem: why is it so difficult, if  not impossible, to 
work out general models of organizational change? Before we turn 
to the first experiences with the introduction and the operation of 
new forms of corporate management, let me refer— in a somewhat 
sketchy way—to some simplistic ideas of organizational change which 
are often the source of high and unfounded expectations. If these 
expectations are not, or not fully, met disappointm ent and often total 




The following quotations are illustrative o f such euphoric expec­
tations in the context of management reform.
“ Nobody can deny that the most spectacular event of the last few 
years in the area of reform of the economic system has been the 
introduction o f  new form s o f  m anagem ent at the firm  level. In 
accordance with the instructions on the implementation of the law 
on state firms, issued at the end of 1984, several hundred state firms 
have adopted [following the data o f early 1986] new forms of m an­
agement.” 1
“ . . . the new enterprise councils change the boundaries of 
authority . . . which is favorable to intrafirm interest relations and  
strengthens industrial democracy.’'’2
“ . . . the introduction of new forms o f management is a qualitative 
change. Now it is clear and unambiguous that operative economic 
decisions are the prerogative of the firm and are no business—except 
in special, extraordinary cases— of the m inistries . . . New property 
rights have been vested in the collective o f  the firm  . . . Thus the 
enterprises became battlefields for industrial democracy whose ex­
periences may later be utilized in the development o f  political de­
mocracy!'7,
“The new management organization is favorable to the m ainte­
nance and long-term enhancement of the firm’s assets. This strength­
ens ownership attitudes and behavior in the workers and revitalizes 
the old, forgotten slogan: “yours is the factory, it is for yourself that 
you build it.”4
All the above quotations are expressions of the opinion that the 
new forms of management are decisive for the implementation of 
the required changes in the economy. Some people hope that these 
new forms will radically change the relations among various interest 
groups, thus contributing towards a better performance o f the en­
terprise; others stress their favorable impact on the workplace, and 
later on political democracy. But none of them  takes acccount of the 
rich social experience accumulated during four decades of organi­
zational and institutional changes under socialism, whose lesson may 
be summed up as follows: the leaders of society cannot mould 
personal relationships as they please, even in the case where the 
majority of those concerned are ready to follow their programs. The 
explanation of this lim it lies in the fact that modern society is a 
very complicated system o f hum an relations, and to change it in 
one or two points is not enough to ensure success. Successful social 
and economic innovations [e.g. the combination of private and col­
lective farms in Hungarian agriculture] have always depended on
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something beyond the good will of the participants. Such innovations 
also presuppose the individual and collective ability to turn partic­
ipants into partners who regulate their relationship in a way which 
promotes initiative.
The success of the new forms of management depends basically 
on how the participants will regulate this partnership. If  troubles 
arise in the process of their im plementation, these are not necessarily 
the result of individual or collective ill-will, incompetence or lack of 
interest on the part of managers or of elected workers. High expec­
tations relative to the new forms of management cannot come true 
if the managers and the representatives o f the non-managerial work­
force do not develop new ways of communicating. The professional, 
social and political skills, necessary to this purpose, may be acquired 
only through investment in hum an relations. From this perspective, 
the success of the new arrangem ents is a question of cooperation 
rather than of dominance.5
As many successful organizational changes testify, the various 
groups affected by the change are adversaries and allies at the same 
time, and the struggle between them  does not rule out cooperation. 
Competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive, but rather 
complementary modes of behavior. The success of the new forms of 
management depends to a large extent on whether it is possible to 
establish regulations favoring both com petition and cooperation.
According to the most recently accepted view, not every conflict 
which accompanies change is in itself positive. It is necessary to 
make a distinction between destructive conflicts and constructive 
conflicts. The former perpetuate the existing organizational and social 
relations, and only the latter promote social-organizational innova­
tion. Unfortunately we do not know exactly through what social and 
economic mechanisms constructive conflicts actually do regulate de­
velopment and change. An im portant lesson of small ventures in 
innovation, undertaken in the early ’eighties, was that the conflicts 
emanating from organizational change initiate positive processes only 
if the mechanisms of social and economic regulation favor individual 
and collective initiative in the long run; otherwise any positive 
economic and social phenomena which may accompany the most 
diverse organizational changes— such as better performance, im ­
proved quality, individual and collective initiatives— remain isolated 
and soon expire. Although such constructive conflicts sometimes 
open up possibilities for organizational and social innovations, their 
impact on firm-level organization as a whole (and, within it, on the
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structure of management) remains partial (residual), serving in the 
final analysis only to its preservation.6
In a tim e o f  institutional reforms, investments in skills that can 
be acquired through social experim entation gain in importance. 
Therefore we have to take into account the possibility that the risk 
of errors and collapses during the transition to new forms of m an­
agement cannot be ruled out. The leadership has to tolerate orga­
nizational experiments even if the organizations go sometimes bank­
rupt. Abortive experiments also may be instrum ental in providing 
better knowledge of the supportive as well as the obstructive com ­
ponents of the “ tissue” of social relations, as regards organizational 
change. [E.g. foreign organizational techniques applied to the work 
process in the early ’seventies highlighted the difficulties o f organi­
zational change from human, technical and economic points of view.7 
Experience gained through social-organizational experiments is an 
investment in better knowledge o f the regulatory mechanisms of 
human relations, and as such is best thought of as a necessary cost 
of change.
II. On new forms of management in a nutshell8
The political decision to start the conversion to new forms of 
management on the level of the firm, plus the jo in t directive of the 
Council o f Ministers and the Trade Union Center, initiated a process 
in which the methods of management will change in four manufac­
turing firms out of five. The explicitly declared objective o f the party 
document and the government decree (which followed the former 
with a delay of more than half-a-year) was to change the relationships 
between the central economic organs [e.g. ministries] and the indi­
vidual state firms, to improve the efficiency o f central management 
and at the same time to enlarge the authority of the firm. In order 
to attain these goals, the rights over socialist property were redis­
tributed between central organs and “com petitive” firms. Employees 
now have institutionalized possibilities to act as owners.9
The new forms of management, established in state firms in the 
period from January 1985 till December 1986, are the following:
1. Enterprise Council
The Enterprise Council is the strategic decision-making unit in 
medium-size and large enterprises. It has dispositional rights over
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the firm’s property and employer rights over the chief executive office 
(CEO).
Operational decisions, necessary for the implementation of the 
firm’s strategy, are the prerogative of the CEO.
The matters which the Enterprise Council has to decide are:
• to elect, to oversee and qualify, in short to act as employer
against, the CEO. (The founder of the firm—the m inistry— how­
ever, has the veto power in the appointm ent and the dismissal of
the CEO.)
• to substantially modify the firm's organization; to decide about 
major splits and mergers.
• to modify the field of activity o f the firm
• to approve the end-of-year balance report-to approve yearly and 
m edium -term  plans
• to approve the principles o f income distribution
• major decisions concerning manpower [e.g. reemployment, train­
ing, lay-offs]
• major decisions concerning firm funds and physical assets
• to approve the firm’s statue
The membership of the enterprise council consists of representa­
tives of management and of the workers. M embers without voting 
rights are the secretaries of the firm’s com m unist party organizations, 
o f the trade union, and of the youth organizations. The CEO is a 
member—but not president— of the council. More than half of the 
membership are the representatives of the workers. They are elected 
by a direct vote of the whole collective for a definite period— usually 
five years. The remaining members of the council are management 
representatives; two-thirds of them, the leaders of major independent 
organizational units [plants, factories], are ex officio members, the 
remaining third are men of the CEO. The council elects from among 
its own members a president and a deputy who act as employers of 
the CEO between the council meetings. The size of the council 
depends on local circumstances but— in order to remain operative— 
cannot exceed 50.
2. Elected leadership
This is a form practiced in smaller state and local council firms. 
The leadership exercises dispositional rights over the property and 
employer rights over the CEO, as the representative of the general
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or electoral assembly of the whole collective. The general assembly 
is convened by the CEO and every employee of the firm takes part 
in it. A general assembly must be held at least once a year.
In the case of management by assembly o f  delegates the members 
of the latter, the delegates, are elected in assemblies held jointly or 
separately by the different organizational units. The delegates— like 
their counterpart, the enterprise council— report on their activity 
once a year (The secretaries o f the communist party, of the union, 
and of the youth organization may take part as non-voting members 
in the assemblies of delegates. The assembly or the enterprise council 
may invite outside experts and ask their advice).
The members of the leadership are elected by the general assembly 
or the assembly of delegates for five years. Their num ber is estab­
lished by the firm’s statute, the president being the CEO ex  officio. 
The powers of the elected leadership are more or less the same as 
those of the enterprise council.10
Among the three forms of collective leadership (enterprise council, 
assembly of delegates and general assembly), the most popular is the 
enterprise council. Eighty percent of the firms included in the pro­
gram of the new forms of management, now have an enterprise 
council; 16% have an assembly of delegates, and 4% a general as­
sembly.
III. Workers and managers in the enterprise council:
“partners” or “adversaries”?
In this chapter I shall try to present some empirically identifiable 
tendencies, discernible in the constitution of enterprise councils. I 
have to stress that these are only tendencies, and not established 
social facts.
The expectations of the society’s political leadership, concerning 
worker participation in the new forms o f firm management, can best 
be documented by the following statement: “ . . .  we are convinced 
that, if we rely largely on industrial workers for the execution of 
these rights, things will— if we do it well— certainly improve, because 
the employees will assume greater responsibility and their attitude 
as owners will be strengthened” .11
Industrial workers, however, did not make much use of the op­
portunities for participation, as our data on the composition of the 
enterprise councils testify. The experiences from the first year of the 
transition to the new forms o f management are sum m ed up in the 
table below.
Composition of enterprise councils
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Responsibilities:





high-level 49% Economist 10%
medium-level 14% Administrative 17%
|
low-level 16%) Manual workers 21%
Non-managerial 21% (among them:
foremen 72%)
Source: Bossanyi Katalin: Demokratizalodo gazdasag-
Atallas a kollektiv vezetesre az iparban /The 
democratization of the economy - the new forms 
of collective management in manufacturing/ 
Gazdasciq. 1986. No. 2. p. 119.
The data on the composition of enterprise councils show low 
worker participation and a dominance of the managerial element, 
mainly high-level. The distribution by occupational skills shows the 
preponderance of technical personnel, followed by adm inistrative and 
manual workers. More than seventy percent of the latter are foremen,
i.e. low level managers. “At the end of 1985 almost 60% o f all 
enterprise councils’ presidents were high-level managers of some kind, 
deputies of the CEO or plant managers.” 12
The arguments put forward to explain the low worker represen­
tation in collective leadership is the following (this list is by no 
means exhaustive):
• compared to other activities [e.g. working in the so-called second 
economy], taking part in the council as a volunteer, or at most 
earning the average hourly wage, “does not pay” ;
• managers and engineers have better, more adaptable skills nec­
essary for participation, than do workers;
• the work of the enterprise council does not really ensure par­
ticipation in decision-making. Worker participation has purely 
ideological-statistical importance;
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• workers are interested only in decisions which have a direct 
effect on their own work situation. As long as there is no progress 
in this area, they are understandably distrustful of all forms of 
participation on a higher level than that of their own shop 
(plant).
The above reasons for staying away from the enterprise councils 
[this list could be continued] suggest that the structure of the deci­
sion-making bodies did not change radically under the new forms 
of management. All this notwithstanding, it would be worth reflecting 
upon some observable tendencies [and to monitor them in future 
research], tendencies which may have been neglected in the past.
Workers’ presence in the enterprise councils will appear more 
pronounced than their share indicated by the statistics, if we take 
into account the special way in which this new institution was 
developed and introduced:
1. Although the actual introduction of new forms of management 
was a trade union task, workers [and even concerned managers] 
were not properly informed about the purpose and the substance o f  
the new arrangements.
There was not enough tim e for workers delegated to enterprise 
councils to get acquainted with, to discuss, or qualify, let alone to 
modify, before the elections, the principles governing the new m an­
agement forms. Therefore the majority o f employees could not assess 
or decide how the new managerial forms would influence their 
individual and collective situation. W ithout this, however, it could 
not be expected that the workers would identify with the new or­
ganization of management.
2. At the end of the first year of the transition period, the unions 
complained about poor preparation. A union-sponsored study on the 
first year’s experience with enterprise councils speaks of insufficient 
preparedness o f  worker delegates: “The activity of the enterprise 
councils concentrates, first of all, on long-term strategy and control 
over its implementation. We have to adm it that these tasks require 
from nonprofessional members of the council skills and knowledge 
hitherto unavailable.” 13
3. Those who initiated the new forms o f firm management did 
not make use of the vast knowledge about worker participation [most 
of it gained through empirical sociological research] which had been 
accumulated by social science. The most im portant lesson that can 
be drawn from this is that workers’ attitude towards participation 
cannot be positive unless proper material incentives and a true 
partnership are established. In the period of the introduction o f the
ENTERPRISE COUNCILS IN HUNGARY 33
new institution of enterprise councils, these problems could not be 
solved satisfactorily. Moreover, the new forum is merely expressing 
opinions, which is much less than true participation. Neither must 
we overlook the fact that participation in management involves 
considerable opportunity cost for the workers because it requires 
additional effort without pay (only “ managerial” members of the 
enterprise council receive their “ordinary” wage for the time spent 
in the council).14
4. The experience with labor-managed firm s  in a capitalist setting 
shows that less attention is often given to the social premises of 
effective worker participation than to other, e.g. legal or financial 
problems. The result is that the level o f worker participation in 
labor-managed firms is not higher than in owner-managed ones.
The most im portant social (“ infrastructural” ) mechanisms, nec­
essary for the success of worker participation, are the following:15
• setting up consultative groups which aid workers in acquiring 
the necessary planning, management etc. knowledge, and eval­
uating their performance;
• summing up local experiences and circulating them nation-wide;
• preparing the managers for a continuing “co-existence” with 
worker participation, and making the workers acquainted with 
the methods of managerial work;
• teaching the young in school the basics of organizational science, 
the requirements of collective work, and how to perform a public 
role;
• introducing a labor policy that favors systems o f incentives and 
promotions, which are based on mutual recognition of compe­
tition and co-operation.
5. Excessively hierarchical and bureaucratic firm organizations 
hinder the formation of com m unicative skills, necessary for efficient 
participation. They can, following their inner logic, put up easily 
with lack of individual and collective worker initiative. The rigid 
distinction of “ managerial” and “ non-managerial” roles produces an 
affirmative culture at shopfloor level. The essence of this culture 
consists in that the manager-worker relationship, as laid down in 
organizational rules and norms, is not the negotiated outcome of the 
competing goals and aspirations of the two partners. Under these 
circumstances, it is management’s prerogative to determine the forms 
of interaction. Organizations set up in this way cannot tolerate 
criticism, and are unable to stimulate a real dialogue between the 
superiors and their subordinates.16
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If we take into consideration all the above-mentioned factors, we 
cannot label the actual worker participation as particularly low. In 
analyzing the share of the different strata of the workforce in the 
enterprise councils it is better to start from social-organizational 
preconditions of participation than from purely ideological-statistical 
considerations. From this perspective the new enterprise councils do 
not seem to be mere "excrescences" of former boards of directors: 
this is in fact the first time that workers and shopfloor managers 
[foremen, their natural allies] appear in a decision-making body. The 
development and later disappearance of the coalition of workers and 
lower management is the result of changing opportunities for the 
articulation of group interests on plant and firm level.17 In the case 
of autonomous work team s [VGMK], the shopfloor management is 
usually conscious of the benefits of its alliance with workers in key 
positions: work done on schedule and without quality problems, low 
worker turnover, etc. At the same time the relatively high wages of 
this group of workers, as compared to those of the foremen, lead to 
tensions. For some shopfloor managers the existence of autonomous 
work teams only means extra work and no advantage. All these 
problems influence the future of the alliance between workers and 
the shopfloor managem ent.18 Foremen and supervisors who are sent 
by workers into the enterprise council, can, if they unite with worker 
representatives (who statistically are a m inority there), have a very 
im portant role in the new managerial body.19 They can draw the 
attention of high and middle level management—the representatives 
of the various departm ents— to the complexities of the production 
process, and thus to the im portance of workers’ knowledge and 
initiative. The autonomous com m unity of the shopfloor is a living 
reality, often indifferent to the subtleties of technology, work process 
or management strategies. Top management by itself is unable to 
recognize and to make use of the collective knowledge and experience 
of the workshop, and the many norms and prescriptions regulating 
it. The presence of shopfloor managers and workers in the enterprise 
councils is an opportunity for the top management to discover the 
“hidden com m unity” of the shopfloor. Today, the possibility to take 
advantage of this discovery is barred by several circumstances, a 
few of which I shall enumerate in the following section.
IV. Loopholes in legal regulation
According to the new law on enterprises, the enterprise council 
has the right to elect, appreciate, qualify and dismiss the CEO. If.
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however, the collective body chooses to dismiss a CEO elected for 
a five year term, it cannot decide on its own. Before voting on 
dismissal (e.g. in the course of disciplinary procedure instituted 
against the members of the CEO) it has to consult the founding 
body (in the case of a state firm, this would be the ministry). In 
addition, it must consult the personnel departm ents of the party and 
the union. Thus the elements of the previous practice o f CEO 
nomination and qualification are preserved. This could facilitate the 
return to the old system. A further complication arises from the fact 
that no CEO can be elected without the prior consent o f its founder, 
but there is no legal stipulation of specific conditions in which the 
consent could be denied.
The right o f  the founder to exert legal supervision over the enterprise 
contributes to the continuation of pre-existing regulative practices. 
Firms do not have general recourse to judicial aid in case o f m in­
isterial abuse.
It is rather unclear who is responsible for eventual wrong decisions 
of the enterprise council [the council or the CEO?]. What is to be 
done if a firm’s difficulties are caused by a CEO strictly obeying a 
wrong decision of the enterprise council or of the founder? The 
responsibility of the council members is even more unclear than that 
of the CEO. W ithout some kind of profit sharing arrangement, the 
personal involvement of the council members cannot be secured. 
The idea that wages also depend on the firm’s profit, and that this 
circumstance may moderate the council’s decisions, is illusory. W ith 
the present confusing system of various taxes, exemptions, and 
subsidies, there is almost no direct correlation between profits and 
personal incomes. At the same time, we have to adm it that the 
above-mentioned inconsistencies in the legal regulations result di­
rectly from the inconsistencies in the economic regulations.
V. Inconsistencies between economic regulations: 
the possibility of a change in reverse
One of the most serious deficiencies of the new forms of m an­
agement [including enterprise councils] is the lack of long-range 
material incentives for participants. Both the managerial and non- 
managerial class of the members of the enterprise councils are 
interested (as they have always been in the past) only in instantaneous 
gains.20
From the viewpoint of the enterprise councils, the main problem 
in the complex area of economic regulation is the lack of a true
36 KOSMAS
profit motive. Although Hungarian firms during the last two decades 
have lived in a profit-oriented environm ent, the true mechanisms of 
the profit motive and its consequences were largely suppressed.21
1. The level o f  realized profits is independent of the competitiveness 
and innovative content of the products. It depends rather on 
many kinds of preferences accorded by the central authorities, 
especially to firms in strong bargaining positions.22
2. The rate-of-return criteria do not assure a rational combination 
of production factors. These are replaced by a kind of “m an u a l” 
regulation, i.e. in that the central economic organs themselves 
decide [using several indices] on investment projects.
3. The aim of economic regulation is not to enhance, but to 
constrain firm activity.
If there is no real change in firm’s autonomy in the near future, 
it is not only that the hopes, economic and social, attached to 
enterprise councils, will be dashed. The principal danger of this 
approach in the long run is that the social partners cooperating 
within the firms will lose their optim ism  as to the possibility o f a 
change for the better. As a consequence, the readiness of different 
groups—within the firm or in the relation between the firm and the 
central organs— to communicate, and to respect each other’s values 
and interests, will dim inish. Parallel to this narrowing of the range 
of activity of the firm, ambivalent and passive behavior will spread 
through the circles of both managers and subordinates.
1 have ventured this short exposition of the problems related to 
the new forms of management, in full awareness of the fact that it 
is always easier to criticize existing schemes than to propose new 
ones. Unfortunately, thus far we possess im portant and convincing 
scientific data only about participation on the level of a work group, 
but not on the level of a big. complex organization. The progress of 
research on participation is hindered by recent contradictory expe­
riences which show that the original organizational hierarchy is 
reproduced even in those cases where the activities of the enterprise 
are formally under worker and employee control.23 However, the 
persistence of these and sim ilar problems does not call into question 
the fact that relative progress can be achieved, if only by workers’ 
acquiring management skills— something which was unimaginable 
under the traditional system.
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